a b s t r a c t Confl ict in health service delivery is common. It is often attributed to disputes between clinicians and patients or their families about treatment decisions and is particularly common in intensive care units (ICUs), in the form of 'futility disputes' between families and medical clinicians about decisions to terminate the active treatment of a dying family member. More common, but less prominent in the literature, is confl ict within the medical profession about patient care goals and treatment. We contend that managing the plurality of medical interests is essential in achieving a more managed and positive experience for patients and families of the care they receive, and for achieving standards of quality and resource use. From an ethnographic study undertaken in a large ICU in Sydney, Australia, we found that the knowledge and practice differences of multiple medical decision-makers generated confl ict, inconsistency of practice and subjectivity of decision-making that impeded coherent clinical decision-making and integrated patient care planning, coordination and care review. Improving patients' and families' experience of care requires medical clinicians and medical managers to accept responsibility for institutionalizing effective communication and decision-making processes within clinical networks and between clinical and managerial domains. Thus, strategies to improve patient care will need to extend beyond the medical profession to incorporate administrative management. We conclude that restructuring communication and decision-making processes is imperative to achieve clinical accountability in the workplace and systems accountability in the organization. 
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Introduction
Medical practice is being closely scrutinized as people in western societies die increasingly in technologically advanced but personally alienating institutional environments (Seale, 1998) . Prolonging life with advanced medical technology, such as occurs in intensive care units (ICUs) , does so at high fi nancial cost to the organization and high personal cost to patients. Dying in such institutions brings with it moral dilemmas, especially where decisions about withholding or withdrawing treatment are concerned. It also brings organizing dilemmas, evident in the paradox between the technical power of medicine to salvage life and the impotence of patients and families to attend to the very personal act of dying (Sullivan, 2003) . Experiencing death as a positive event can be impaired if technological intervention is prolonged and the patient's human needs are neglected. A central problem in meeting patients' medical and human needs is negotiating and integrating the opinions and practices of intradisciplinary medical clinicians who treat patients in common, but whose clinical knowledge bases and treatment orientations differ. In this article, we consider the multiplicity and diversity of medical views as they pertain to patient care, and maintain that medical clinicians and clinical managers must develop a collective capacity for structuring participative communication and decision-making processes, as routine, within and between clinical units so that clinical practice and patient care is purposeful, coherent and integrated.
The demand for care is increasing, costs are escalating and consumers, administrators and policymakers are calling for transparency of process and accountability for outcomes in health services worldwide (Hyde and Cooper, 2001 ). This transformation is occurring within clinical environments characterized by uncertainty about treatment outcomes, their cost and their impact on a patient's quality of life, and medical decisions that commit high cost resources where a patient's survival is doubtful are being questioned amid expectations that patients themselves should determine their care goals. We advance the view that clinicians are in the best position to understand and respond to expectations of accountability within the complex technical and ethical environment of health care, but in doing so, and in responding to scrutiny, clinicians must be skilled in critically refl ecting upon and assessing the adequacy of existing systems of care, including their own.
We base our views on research conducted in a large ICU in Sydney, Australia, that sought to assess the process of medical decision-making. Our interest was to understand the pressures that medical clinicians and managers are under as they negotiate patient care decisions within highpressure, high-cost, high-technology environments. Our article is structured in the following way. First, we provide some background to clinical decision making. We then outline our method. Next, we present excerpts representative of the themes emerging from our research and interpret them within the context of medical decision-making. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for structuring medical decision-making. We conclude that medical clinicians themselves can and should take responsibility for bringing order to fragmented decision-making processes, but we also conclude that they will be unable to do so, unsupported. Where traditional professional hierarchical status-based relationships impact on the capacity of clinicians to design, agree and implement effective new decisionmaking processes, organizational policies and processes are needed to guide clinicians and managers to reorient both their expectations of organizational behaviour and their clinical practice. We situate our discussion within a review of the literature on medical decision-making at end-of-life to which we now turn.
Background
The context of clinical decision-making
Clinical decision-making is a complex and diffi cult process, comprising as it does life and death decisions involving multiple decision-makers with differing goals. Confl ict is common (Stoddert et al., 2003) . One source of confl ict is whether clinicians alone have the authority to withdraw or withhold treatment, or whether the patient or their family, as surrogates in the event that a patient is unconscious, have the power to prevent it (Way et al., 2002) . Paradoxically, the myriad statutory provisions that cover the legal obligations of physicians and rights of patients at end-of-life can increase the ambiguity in this regard rather than clarify it. This absence of clear legal guidance within which clinicians can confi dently practise encourages a climate of defensiveness where intervention can extend well beyond the point of futility (Melia, 2001) .
Claims for medical primacy in decision-making are defended from a number of standpoints. Some in the profession argue that the patient, not the surrogate, is master; and, by virtue of the trust relationship established between physicians and their patients, medical decisions ipso facto equate with patients' best interests (Chaitin et al., 2003) . In the event that patient/ family wishes and clinical opinion are not in accord, medical authority is reinterpreted as a duty to the profession and an obligation to society (Sprung, 1995) . However, the propensity for courts to acknowledge the interests of surrogates regardless of whether they seek termination or its denial fuels a climate of confl ict (Cantor, 1996) . This legal acknowledgement establishes the participation of families and patients in care decisions as a basic human right (White and Baldwin, 2002) . Seen in another way, if courts of law are a refl ection of changing societal values, and if legal processes uphold patient/ family participation in decisions that affect them, insisting on medical primacy misses the direction of this signifi cant social change.
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Decision-making in the workplace
More at issue are those decisions not mediated through courts of law (Larkin, 2002) . Here, organizational safeguards become important in guiding clinician actions and protecting patient and surrogate interests. Reducing the risks to patients and conserving high-cost resources means that formal and transparent procedures are needed to guide clinicians where most clinical decisions are made, in the clinical workplace. While policies are being developed to guide decision-making, they are being devised in the absence of an understanding of how these complex processes work, involving as they do multiple medical clinicians with different knowledge, practices and values (Cassell et al., 2003) . Clinicians vary in the way they practise and variations in patient outcomes are common. Variations that occur within specialties feature in the literature, but those between specialties rarely so (Wood and Angus, 2001) . Where variations are being addressed in the case of intensive care, work mainly focuses on the care of patients who survive rather than those who are dying.
Family experiences are an important source of information about the needs of dying people. Families expect to have a voice in patient care decisions and to have their own needs taken into account (Oppenheim and Sprung, 1998 ). Yet the wishes of the patient and family members are not always taken in to account (Sorensen and Iedema, 2006) and developing family trust in medical advice so as to reduce the confl ict that can arise in these situations is seen to lie in improving medical clinicians' communication competencies (Curtis and Rubenfeld, 2001 ). However, if such strategies are based on the assumption that family rejection of medical advice is the problem and improving clinician capacity to impart bad news is the answer; the solution itself may be problematic. To interpret the problem in intensive care decision-making as solely or mainly confl ict between clinicians and families misses the point about what constitutes mutually agreed care. Accepting medical authority at face value excludes the range of factors that can affect its credibility and objectivity. How decisions are reached, what knowledge is regarded as valid, whose views are accepted and whose decision is taken as fi nal all impact on whether a patient's condition is judged as 'salvageable' or 'futile'. That is, decision-making, including medical decision-making, is a social and political process and when seen in this light, decisions are neither objective nor defensible if based on clinicians' own interests and value systems (Larkin, 2002) .
Thus, critical issues in clinical decision-making will revolve around clinicians' capacity to identify the limitations of their practice, to acknowledge the diversity of values and interests involved and to routinely incorporate them within practice decisions. Some clinicians resent suggestions that maintaining clinical competency is a lifelong learning process and reject the need to keep skills current and relevant. Perhaps not surprisingly, models of care for dying people are generally not found in standard intensive care medical or surgical texts. This is surprising, given that clinician confi dence in withdrawing and withholding decisions cannot be confi rmed empirically nor the apparent increase in decision-making confi dence that accompanies medical seniority be relied upon (Walter et al., 1998) . This attitude to clinical competency suggests that skills in the care of the dying are assumed to be intrinsic to practitioners, learned on the job, not needed or not important. Where such knowledge and skills are desired, they must be accessed via a separate non-medical literature.
Networks in health care
Clearly, the quality of care will depend on the extent to which clinicians can and do take responsibility for process improvement, and there is an emerging literature on the effectiveness of teams in organising health care (FirthCozens, 1998; Freidson, 1994) . Much of this literature is normative, although there is a growing awareness of the use of informal social networks to transfer knowledge rather than formally constituted teams (Mano-Negrin and Mittman, 2001 ). In the case of medicine, these networks manifest more as densely connected cliques from which other members of the treating team risk being excluded, for instance nurses, junior medical staff, patients and families, and ultimately administrative managers (West et al., 1999) . Hence, meeting participation and accountability objectives may mean devising a more strategic approach to overcome assumptions that clinical decisions are the province of loosely coupled autonomous high-status individuals who, alone, decide care.
In reality, many different groups have interests in care decisions and their outcomes. Thus, clinical decisions can involve more than one doctor and more than one specialty contributing different views and different interests (Atkinson, 1995) . Decision-making is therefore a social process with decisions 'constructed' over time, and devising workable new approaches requires that the particulars of difference be understood and managed. These particulars are not commonly discussed in the medical literature, although a strong social science literature exists (Atkinson, 1995; Cassell, 1991; Zussman, 1992) . Signifi cantly, not all difference becomes confl ict, and not all confl ict concerns patient care; non-care causes are more common, and include uncertainty about patients' wishes, poor communication within networks and a lack of leadership and coordination within and between them (Stoddert et al., 2003) . Confl ict often pits surgeons against physicians, and the divergent goals of these two health professional groups and their competition for power and control is well documented (Cassell et al., 2003) . Such established medical sub-cultures reinforce status and power differences and encourage individual competitive stances that become barriers to more cooperative and integrated forms of care.
Embedded in these cultures is a determination to defend the profession's privileges as its authority wanes (Zussman, 1992) . Discretion in health: 12 (1) decision-making is a strongly defended professional privilege, and any threat to it may serve to contain discussions about the rights of others rather than to embrace and extend them. Thus, there may be no established expectations or routines within the culture to collectively consider abstract principles of practice, such as participative decision-making or collective accountability (Atkinson, 1995) . However, the demand for beds, their high cost and sub-optimal ward care foreshadow triage to ICU as an issue of contention be-tween medical subspecialists about the rights of individual patients versus those of patient populations (McQuillan et al., 1998) . Thus, the individualist stance of some medical clinicians and their commitment to the interests of individual patients may shift to a more utilitarian stance of commitment to patient populations, infl uenced by the patients' rights movement (Zussman, 1992) .
There is disagreement in the literature about whether the traditional status-based hierarchy of medicine impedes or enables good decision outcomes. On the one hand, there is a view that the medical hierarchy works well in regulating professional relationships in place of a formal organizational authority (Mintzberg, 2002) , while on the other, references to an inbred culture, junior deference to senior clinicians' views and an inability of the profession to control the behaviour of its members attests to a deepseated problem of a profession short on self-refl ection and averse to incorporating differing world views (Freidson, 1994) . The moral education that medical students receive along with their technical training suggests that medical socialization continues to perpetuate traditional stances, and managing the 'emotional toxins' of ward-based cultures can cause doctors to psychologically withdraw from their patient responsibilities and to close ranks (Obholzer, 2005; Zussman, 1992) . Thus, clinicians' moral education will need to focus on how to become team players, to collectively identify clinical and systems problems and to articulate solutions, to communicate, to share decisions and to negotiate agreement about action.
Managing professional power, status and authority and the differences that underpin them is therefore central to smooth working relationships within and between medical networks and to achieving accountability for patient and organizational outcomes. Crucial here is knowing who constitutes a network, what they do, how they do it and to what purpose. This knowledge must take into account the personal, professional and organisational capacity of medical clinicians to change cultures, to change identities and to change practices. It requires them to not only refl ect upon their own practices and assess where problems lie, but also to collectively devise workable solutions to manage plurality, specifi cally the plurality of medical interests within and between clinical units that treat patients in common. To assess the extent to which such processes exist, we undertook a qualitative study of the attitudes and practices of clinicians in intensive care as it related to medical decision-making for critically ill people, and it is to this that we next turn.
Method
The study was ethnographic in design and conducted in an adult ICU in a large metropolitan public teaching hospital in Sydney, Australia, between January 2000 and June 2002. The unit examined is a hub of clinical activity, with constant pressure on beds and clinical resources; patient status is regularly triaged to manage care within available resources; multiple stakeholders are involved with varying levels of patient care, from intense interaction to irregular contact, with different levels of knowledge and interest and varying levels of patient care responsibility. In this context, intensive care is an ideal setting within which to consider the routine structuring of care processes as a strategy to manage confl ict and improve clinical practice based on accountability for cost and quality outcomes. Ethics approval was gained from the hospital in which the study was conducted. Extensive case notes were compiled progressively throughout the study, comprising 240,000 words of transcript. Table 1 outlines the project's modes of data gathering, participants and study sessions.
Interviews and focus groups were conducted and tape-recorded by a social scientist and transcribed by a professional service; case notes were taken of observations in family conferences, clinician interactions with patients and ward rounds. The data gathered were analysed by a social health: 12 (1) scientist, a policy analyst and an organizational behaviourist using grounded theory techniques and categorized using open coding methods (Glaser and Strauss, 1968) . Themes and patterns that emerged were analysed using the constant comparative method, from which tentative theories were generated that were further contextualized using specifi c literature reviews. The basis for interpreting the data relating to the theme presented here was selected statements emblematic of categories that constituted broad emergent themes and illustrating properties of the concepts under scrutiny. The theme of this article, the plurality of medical interests in end-of-life care, is discussed in the section following; other themes emerging from this study are reported elsewhere (Iedema, 2005; Iedema et al., 2004; Sorensen et al., 2006; Sorensen, 2007) .
Stakeholders in medical decision-making
This article concerns the relationships between medical stakeholders in their capacity as patient care decision-makers. Our data show that four main medical stakeholder groups were principally involved in intensive care decision-making: intensive care (ICU) staff specialists, external (mostly surgical) consultants, registrars (both internal and external to the unit) and clinical managers of the unit. External medical specialists were involved with the care of ICU patients either as the admitting medical offi cer or as a specialist consultant post-admission. ICU clinicians maintained the general care of patients day-to-day. Registrars external to the unit performed a dayto-day role, transmitting information about patient status between the unit and external consultants. We next present the data and interpret it under two headings: negotiating decisions between clinical teams and negotiating practice variations between clinical teams.
Negotiating decisions between clinical teams
In this section, we address the relationships between medical clinicians internal and external to the unit. Our data show that different medical subspecialties tended to maintain a distance from each other, and that specialty and status differences affected the extent to which decision processes were integrated. Signifi cant for the overall care of the patient, ICU clinicians professed a generalist role based on a holistic clinical orientation. However, the extent to which they could enact this role depended on a complex interplay of relationships between stakeholders. To continue to profess such a role, ICU clinicians must come to terms with the implications of coordinating the activities of the multiple (inter-and intra-disciplinary) clinicians who care for patients in ICUs. This will entail institutionalizing systems for pooling information, negotiating differences in clinical opinion and treatment practices, forging agreement about patient care goals and coordinating treatment activities. The excerpt below, spoken by a senior staff specialist and medical manager of the unit, illustrates their view of I think it's our job to look after the whole patient and to keep the goal in mind and the overall picture in mind … and their job (external consultants) is usually just to look after their little bit.… It is rare for one of the other teams to come up and say, you know, do you think we should pull out now.… But yes it's usually ICU initiated and ICU driven. Sometimes it's relative initiated, but not often. (11.04.02) This excerpt establishes biological territoriality as the way through which responsibilities for patient care are mediated and negotiated. Their holistic focus allows ICU clinicians to take a comprehensive clinical perspective in patient care decisions, while the sphere of external consultants is contained. The central position of ICU clinicians in coordinating and analysing patient information is crucial to decisions about treatment withdrawal and withholding, because it allows them to take decisions about patient 'salvage' or treatment 'futility' based on the viability of the body as a whole, and not just of a discrete part. That is, even though individual organs may be functioning, ICU clinicians can determine if and when the overall biological integrity of the patient is compromised. Their holistic clinical orientation provides ICU clinicians with an 'override' decision capability, in the event that their views differ from those of external consultants. Their power in this respect is not assumed; deft handling is required to negotiate acceptance of their views. Their discursive stances assist ICU clinicians to both obtain external specialist acceptance of futility or, where necessary, to block it. Even though ICU clinicians have the advantage of a comprehensive knowledge of the patient's status, they may not have the professional status to openly confront surgeons, generally regarded as of higher status in the medical hierarchy (Cassell, 1991) , nor the in-depth knowledge of particular subspecialties to take unilateral decisions, as the next excerpt, spoken by the same senior staff specialist, implies:
And usually your fi rst opening gambit is not: we're going to do it right now. It's: we're thinking about this; what about some limitations.… Sometimes the surgeons will come up and say: oh I think it's time to stop now, we shouldn't do any more. And we can say: well look, you know, it's not too bad, really we should just keep going for a little bit longer. (11.04.02) Three issues arise from these excerpts that relate to the quality of patient care. Firstly, ICU clinicians positioned themselves to assert decision-making power commensurate with a holistic stance that supports their claim of an expert clinical generalist role. However, as generalists, ICU clinicians did not play a planning and coordinating role in patient care. Routine processes were not used to comprehensively seek and weigh the range of opinions and interests, and decision making was not systematic, comprehensive and inclusive of the views of involved stakeholders. Thus, dispersed information and opinion were not collected under the auspices of particular occasions of health: 12 (1) talk (Atkinson, 1995: 53) . Rather it was ad hoc, involving medical principals only. Second, decisions to limit intervention were initiated by individual ICU medical clinicians acting as if part of a united team, that consolidated ICU clinician power and positioned them in the role of 'doer'; an initiator of intervention; a role valued in medicine and an attribute of surgeons (Cassell, 1991) . Third, this decisive, action-oriented, interventionist stance provided the basis on which ICU clinicians could challenge the decisions of surgeons, and their holistic orientation allowed them to check the specialist expertise of surgeons and to assume decision-making authority.
These attitudes to, and modes of communication about patient care between surgeons and ICU clinicians refl ected an uneasy relationship and contestation about patient care decision-making that further served to circumscribe surgeon power and authority in the ICU. On behalf of the unit, the same staff specialist speaking in the next excerpt intimates that communication responsibility is not their role, even though this could reasonably be expected within a generalist/coordinating function. The staff specialist asserts clinical autonomy that separates the internal ICU team from the 'other teams' who treat patients in common. The communicating responsibility is moved away from the unit and away from a collaborative stance that places the onus for seeking information elsewhere. Paradoxically, ICU clinicians tended to delineate roles and defi ne and articulate the responsibility of others, even though this 'always causes confl ict'. The manner in which this occurred is important. The accepted code of professional conduct is to defer to the views of higher-status clinicians. However, the expectations are sometimes 'just too much'. Here, the clinician eschews mannerly conduct and again asserts power to claim authority and independence of action and to determine priorities. To do otherwise, to take a collaborative stance and move towards the other would reduce their position in the medical hierarchy, that would also reduce their decision-making authority and control, as the staff specialist indicates:
Communication with other teams is a diffi cult thing in ICU. … It is not our job to inform them what we're doing, it's their job to come and see the patient and have a discussion with us. And that always causes confl ict.
… in the interests of good communication … I should listen and be nice and all that sort of thing, but sometimes it's just too much and you just say, well look, you know this is just not important, or no we are not doing that. It's a constant source of frustration.
If they expect us to ring them and tell them every time something goes wrong with the patient then we just feel like we're being treated as their registrars. (11.04.02)
The frustration expressed by the staff specialist suggests that they feel put upon by external clinicians and that they must check what they regard as unreasonable expectations in order to do their job as they see that it should be done. This confl ict between different medical groups has implications for patient care and care outcomes. This is not surprising. What is surprising is that there were no systems evident through which differences of opinion could be aired and resolved as a matter of course, and acceptable clinical routines and collegiate relationships established and sustained. Rather, the staff specialist's wearied tone suggests that the confl ict and frustration are recurring and regular. In the stakes for power, on which the independence of ICU clinicians stands, withholding information and refusing to initiate contact, without sanction, is synonymous with and symbolic of power. However, if this assertion of power results in important information about the patient being withheld from those who require it, and/or if care decisions and interventions are not taken in an effective and timely manner, patient care may be compromised. Here, the role of registrar as the medium of communication between these two powerful medical stakeholders becomes signifi cant. As a junior functionary who conveys complex information between high-status adversaries, these 'overtrained messengers' (Zussman, 1992) may not be able to prevent messages from being misinterpreted, ignored or dismissed and the chance for 'something (to go) wrong' becomes endemic.
A different senior staff specialist continues in the next excerpt, discussing the effectiveness of the information transmission role of the (external surgical) registrar. Effectiveness is dependent on the competence of individual registrars to manage the variety of personalities at either end of the communication chain. The specialist acknowledges the possibility that this method might be dysfunctional, but discounts it as hypothetical: So she (the registrar) just has to learn to deal with everybody. I mean I could be a real bastard; she just has to learn how to deal with me. (Named doctor) could be really nice to her; she just needs to learn how to deal with her. … during her career she'll come across a few really bad ones -she has to live with that. … if I thought my idiosyncracies made (registrars) dysfunctional. … (11.04.02) These dysfunctional relationships and the social and organizational fragmentation of patient care were not addressed in any systematic way either by the service's administrative managers or by the unit's clinical managers. The impact of this fragmentation on the patient and on other caregivers emerges in the next series of excerpts drawn from focus group discussions with nurses and are presented here because of the unique position that nurses hold in witnessing medical interactions with patients and with other caregivers. Nurses regarded external clinicians as rude; dismissive of patients, of nurses and of ICU doctors. A persistent complaint from nurses in focus groups was their dissatisfaction with the conduct of external specialists. The fi rst excerpt in the bracket below describes perceived inappropriate conduct of 'outside teams'. The less-experienced nurse speaking fi rst judged negatively the offhand nature of specialist interaction with patients, particularly their propensity to congregate at the end of the bed and discuss the patient's case without acknowledging the patient. Patients' views appear to be peripheral health: 12 (1) to care decisions and to clinicians' concerns (Anspach, 1987) . This exclusionary practice can cause problems not only for patients, but also for families if the different teams involved in caring for the patient fail to coordinate information and action. An experienced nurse raises this point in the following excerpt in this bracket. The medical information on which families must make diffi cult life-or-death decisions often had different and potentially confl icting elements. This data suggest that patient-centred care, which includes clarifying confl icting information on which patients and relatives must base decisions, is not the dominant orientation for decisionmaking within the unit.
… the [external] doctors would talk at the end of the bed and just walk away. And I'm like -hullo, who are you talking about? The teams come in here -not necessarily the ICU doctors but the outside teams -will come in here and they'll, oh ya ya at the end of the bed, write their notes and walk off. They don't even talk to the patient. They don't even touch the patient. How are they supposed to know what's happening? (05.05.02)
Plus also having other teams as well involved. It's not just our intensive care doctors … like if a family has spoken to the neuro-surgeon they're getting different things from both sides. Like the neuro-surgeon is just dealing with the head, nothing else. And they're telling them…. (05.03.02) In the next excerpt, spoken by a different less-experienced nurse, performance data emerges as a front in the ongoing battle between medical specialties. Details of information compiled by ICU clinicians about individual external clinician performance in terms of deaths that were unexpected and patients that had been left in ICU unclaimed by an external admitting medical offi cer, highlighted 'in red' with reasons for poor outcomes, were discounted because they were not ostensibly about quality. This ICU manager's attempt to play a generalist coordinating role as described here that could enhance accountability by reporting outcomes was rejected:
we would send reports out, you know -unexpected death, unclaimed ICU admission, all that sort of thing -and actually in red, highlighting the reasons for why and getting little letters back from (external) doctors saying: well this is about quality not about an exercise in statistics and drawing and stuff like that. (05.05.02)
The absence of cooperation and failure to use this common ground of performance information as an opportunity to discuss issues of mutual interest suggests that not only are problem identifi cation and solution generation diffi cult for these clinicians, but potentially impossible without organizational intervention. Changing expectations and relationships between medical networks is slow. Preparing, disseminating and reviewing data about performance as the basis for individual and collective refl ection on practice is a strategy that could enhance accountability but which can also be interpreted as a threat within the environment of competition and confl ict described. Ensuring accountability for outcomes that include quality of patient care and resource use requires clinicians to establish systems through which their practices can be scrutinized by all those who are collectively responsible and by clinical managers with responsibility for allocating resources, coordinating activity and managing overall performance. But competition between medical networks for primacy, status and control, evident in their modes of communication, impedes care coordination between medical clinicians, between nursing and medical disciplines, with patients and with families, and diminishes an ICU leadership capacity to act as patient care managers. It can also impede their ability to recognize and develop organizational systems to manage plurality and to reduce practice variations that can affect patient outcomes and it is this latter issue to which we next turn.
Negotiating practice variations between clinical teams
ICU clinicians, specifi cally ICU clinical managers, must set professional rivalries aside to constructively engage with external teams to assess the shortcomings of present practice and to collectively devise sustainable systems through which information can be pooled, care goals agreed and the sensitive disclosure of information to the patient and the family coordinated. As well as devising effective modes for communicating patient care information, clinicians must also devise effective means to manage clinical issues, particularly practice variations that arise from differences in knowledge that can impact adversely on patient care. By addressing practice variations, differences in knowledge and orientation can be identifi ed and aligned. A senior staff specialist provides an example of a practice variation, gas trapping, as a cause of confl ict between clinical teams and describes the mutual incomprehension of, in this instance, respiratory physicians who do not share an ICU knowledge base. A different staff specialist commented that these instances can multiply into 'hundreds' (15.05.01).
Well there was a confl ict with the respiratory physicians about how you actually treat these patients acutely and it revolves around the discussion really of gas trapping. We think that gas trapping is really important but they don't think that gas trapping is really important and all our treatments are directed at minimising gas trapping whereas they don't think it actually exists to some extent and so there was some confl ict between us and them as to how he should actually be treated. I mean it must be diffi cult for them seeing us do something that they don't actually agree with but our literature is so full of … (14.04.02)
Other than private conversations between individual consultants, systems and processes to manage such differences, while alluded to, were not evident from observation. This is surprising as the reference to 'these people' suggests that collectivities of patients have already fallen into the knowledge gap between ICU clinicians and respiratory physicians. Signifi cant in the next excerpt is the language used by the staff specialist acknowledging both knowledge difference and the possibility of resolution. If this is the case, and health: 12 (1) problems can be identifi ed and agreed, discussion of knowledge differences may represent an opportunity around which broader collaborative agreement can be built. The abstract nature of conceptual knowledge issues may explain the apparent lesser contestation compared to that around specifi c patient care decisions in which the urgency and immediacy of decisions and responsibility for outcomes can amplify power, status and authority differences:
(W)hat we decided to do … is actually to have a meeting with them and make sure that they circulate us their literature beforehand and we circulate ours, so that we can have a discussion about how we are going to treat these people; because our treatment seems to be incomprehensible to them and theirs seems incomprehensible to us -uhm there must be some middle ground. (11.04.02) Accountability for outcomes is important in health care, particularly in environments characterized by individual practice, uncertain prognoses, medico-legal defensiveness, high levels of subjectivity in decision-making, imprecise decision aids and variations in practice. Managing in such environments will require both managers and clinicians to have the comprehension, knowledge and skill to understand, organize and manage variability. In contrast to expectations of accountability from other clinicians, for example dissemination of performance data, intensive care clinicians did not devise such systems of accountability for themselves. Individualism, uncertainty, subjectivity and variation continue to exist in the absence of unit processes to bring continuity to patient care and to incorporate the knowledge of all unit caregivers, including specifi cally the intuitive knowledge of nurses, the wishes of patients and the values of families about death and dying, as legitimate interests. We turn next to discuss the implications for playing such a role as a means of managing the plurality of medical interests in intensive care.
Discussion
The locale of intensive care
An increasing focus on intensive care in legal, policy and practice terms foregrounds it as instructive in understanding the ethical, professional and organizational constraints on clinical practice and clinical practice change. In this respect, the main factor impeding good end-of-life care is thought to be futility disputes that arise when family members are unable to accept the reality of their loved one's impending death and the withholding or withdrawal of treatment. Our research demonstrates, however, that other sources of confl ict, specifi cally unresolved confl ict between medical subspecialists who treat patients in common but who diverge in knowledge, orientation and practice, are also signifi cant impediments.
Futility disputes are a major block to achieving good care at end-of-life and to reducing the cost of care. They are, however, only one part of a complex dynamic of relationships within which intensive care is practised. We seek to contribute to the literature on changing practice in intensive care by redefi ning the problem not as clinician/family confl ict, although this is certainly an issue, but also as clinician/clinician confl ict. Maintaining power, status and authority in the traditional medical hierarchy as new clinical knowledge emerges is fraught and contested. Within this environment, futility disputes arise, not only from a lack of trust of families of medical decisions, but also from the diffi culty that medical clinicians face engaging with the personal, social and organizational consequences of negotiating treatment decisions as patients and families, and clinicians, struggle to come to terms with the experience of death. For medical clinicians, confl ict with families is only one part of a long chain along which the contest for authority is primary as the fortunes of medical subspecialties advance and decline. Interpreted in this way, futility disputes are a microcosm of a broader struggle for professional power and control. While our study confi rms the social and political nature of medical decision-making, the personal struggles of clinicians and their disengagement from diffi cult interactions with peers, colleagues and patients emerges as a critical factor in decision-making.
Confl ict is not, of itself, a problem. Problems emerge in the absence of effective communication systems through which differences can be aired and challenged and agreement forged. Mechanisms to routinely plan, manage and review care by systematizing, standardizing and integrating multidisciplinary, multi-service care processes are rarely institutionalized in health care organizations. In their absence, clinicians must rely on traditional modes of interaction that become anachronisms in complex, diverse and technologically sophisticated environments such as intensive care. Within such environments, personality, status and hierarchy are insuffi cient to manage the complexity of modern patient care and to achieve the levels of service expected by patients and funders alike. Our data confi rm that loose social networks are the basis for information transfer and decision-making. It also confi rms that strategies that reinforce informal social networks that rely on the personalities of individual managers and clinicians as the main mechanism for patient care decision-making are necessary but not sufficient to effect the type of change that our fi ndings presage as needed. Thus, patient care decision-making is an organizational issue, and one that may extend beyond the capacities of individual clinicians and clinical managers to redefi ne.
New systems of interaction and care
Opportunities to bridge the communication divide may lie in negotiating knowledge differences between different subspecialties. The prospect of negotiating a common approach to conceptual, abstract, clinical-knowledge differences appears to be less confrontational than negotiating intervention decisions about individual patients. Such changed practices could become health: 12(1) the means through which individual, subjective and opaque accountability processes transform into a collective, objective and transparent system. The interaction most appropriate to achieve collectivity in networks of loosely coupled high-status individuals appears to be interdisciplinary; that is, goals of care are fi rst agreed by different disciplinary networks whose members then negotiate and coordinate their input to the common treatment plan.
Restructuring new systems of interaction and care calls for an understanding of intensive care as a locale where rules are time limited and goals are loosely agreed between diverse clinical sub-cultures (Strauss et al., 1963) . Within intensive care, rules are being 'rewritten' as intensive care clinicians assert their independence from the traditional authority of surgeons, based on a new knowledge base. Redefi ning clinicians as knowledge workers with responsibility to collectively identify problems and to discuss and agree practice and care goals allows rules to be renegotiated and social relationships to be reordered. Collectively identifying knowledge differences will shine a light on outmoded practices without singling out individuals, and deeply rooted habits can be shed as care goals are collectively reinterpreted and practice reoriented (Minssen, 2006) .
Diffusing status, power and authority
Our data confi rm that practice variations between different medical specialties are not discussed or resolved as routine. Rather, performance information is used as a weapon in a continuing battle for supremacy between high-status individuals. Yet performance scrutiny is a way through which difference can be exposed, goals reinterpreted and practice reoriented (Azofra et al., 2003) . Vertical performance reporting and horizontal peer scrutiny can restructure locally produced knowledge through which difference can be dispassionately acknowledged and the plurality of interests routinely managed (Iedema et al., 2006) . The generalist role of ICU clinicians may be an obvious starting point through which loosely coupled networks come together to develop a set of related practices around which complex care can be planned, coordinated and evaluated (Wartofsky, 2000) . Such resocializing will need to encompass senior administrative managers in the organization, if the multiplicity and diversity of interests are to be systematically addressed organization-wide. Democratic management methods will be essential in seeking the cooperation of peers and colleagues in recognizing, accepting and enacting a collective responsibility for organizing and managing care, irrespective of their position in the hierarchy (Mintzberg, 2002) . Organizational support from administrative managers will be crucial in setting standards and reorienting clinicians' expectations in line with a collective responsibility via formal workplace agreements through which changed relationships can be articulated, team-based accountability delineated and collective practices systematized.
Conclusion
Our intention in this article was to assess the attitudes and practices of clinicians in intensive care as it related to decision-making for critically ill people. Much is written about medical socialization in particular regimes of care (Zussman, 1992) and the cultures of particular medical specialties (Cassell, 1991) , and medical discourse was often assumed to be unitary. We were unable to locate work that described the day-to-day processes through which different subspecialists collectively make decisions on behalf of patients for whom they shared care (Atkinson, 1995) . Our article addresses this absence. Our study found that dysfunctional relationships between ICU clinicians and external medical consultants, principally surgeons, was a barrier to enacting models of patient-centred care with which the health care literature is replete. Within the struggle for decision-making authority, decision processes are frequently individual, arbitrary, contested and fraught, and the way in which the struggle is viewed determines the strategies appropriate to manage it. If viewed personally, conclusions may be drawn that individual clinicians are at fault. If viewed politically, professional rivalries and subspecialty ascendancy are at its root. Traditional status differences are being upset as intensive care carves out a new territory in the professional hierarchy. Intensive care control of day-to-day patient care via a holistic clinical orientation is resisted by surgeons through nonengagement with, rejection of and disparagement about ICU-initiated activities (Cassell, 1991) . Lower-status trainee specialist registrars do not jeopardize this established order and the culture of medicine only uneasily accommodates new knowledge, new practice and new directions.
In the case of intensive care, treatment is a collective, multiprofessional and multidisciplinary activity yet medical clinicians practise within a traditional, individualist, taken-as-given culture. The thesis of our article is that where decisions about patient care involve a multiplicity of medical stakeholder skills and interests, the quality of patient care will depend on the extent to which integrated decision-making processes exist to manage differences between them and to forge consistent policies and practices across treating teams and within treating units: that is, the extent to which the medical sub-cultures can integrate clinical processes and practices. Our view is that restructuring medical decision-making processes, as routine, will allow for the views of other stakeholders, including nurses, patients and families to be incorporated.
Establishing workable new processes that challenge entrenched cultures will require organizational competencies that include systems to review performance that extend beyond the present competencies of individual clinicians and clinical managers. These competencies are being developed, as the competition for scarce resources forces clinicians to move beyond the interests of individual patients to those of patient populations. Important here is practically and effectively linking clinical and administrative domains health: 12(1) to identify those patients who can potentially benefi t from high cost care and being accountable for the outcomes of that care. A framework for governing health services will link service objectives to performance outcomes, and emphasize the structural and processual nature of change and corporate and clinical contributions to performance. Developing policies and processes to guide clinical care, their systematic translation into clinical practice, integrating multiple service providers, protecting patients' rights and standardizing interventions all require organizational strategies beyond the capacity of any single clinical or managerial profession to devise and implement. In this context, organizational accountability for the power placed in the hands of clinicians to make life and death decisions will be a signifi cant factor in maintaining public trust in their judgements and skills that is at the heart of accountability for the quality and cost of patient care.
